Technology and security of the docMan Box.
docMan is software for receipts and invoices, filing and bookkeeping preparation. As a rule it runs at the customer's site on its own small server in the office (the “docMan Box”) – the documents stay on the premises. The other options, up to and including the cloud, are described in “Where docMan runs – the options”. Part A describes how the box is set up and secured, and what we deliberately do not do. Part B describes the hardware and environment we require if the customer provides the server themselves, and how the handover works.
↓ Download PDF (German)In short
- The data is stored on two mirrored SSDs, fully encrypted (LUKS2, AES-256). Without the device itself, it cannot be read.
- From the office network, only docMan in the browser is reachable (HTTPS, port 443). There is no port forwarding on the router.
- We maintain the box exclusively over an encrypted Tailscale network, with a key only, never with a password.
- The box cannot reach any other device on its own initiative, neither in the customer's network via our access nor on our side. Tunnels and forwarding are disabled.
- No remote editors or AI assistants run on the box. This is technically blocked.
Part A – How a docMan Box is set up
Described using our reference device; every box is set up in the same way.
A1 · Hardware and system
| Component | Specification |
|---|---|
| Device | Lenovo ThinkCentre M90q Gen 6 (Tiny), Intel Core Ultra 7 265, 32 GB RAM, without Windows |
| System SSD | 512 GB NVMe – operating system and programs only, no customer data |
| Data SSDs | 2 × Samsung 990 Pro 2 TB NVMe as a mirror (RAID 1) |
| Operating system | Ubuntu Server 26.04.1 LTS (long-term support), minimal installation, no graphical interface |
| Firmware | UEFI with Secure Boot on, TPM 2.0 on; after a power cut the device starts by itself |
| Power | UPS APC Back-UPS BX750MI, shuts the box down cleanly in a power cut |
A2 · Storage: mirror and encryption
The customer data (documents, database, backups) is stored exclusively on the encrypted mirror:
- Mirror (RAID 1): Both SSDs always contain the same data. If one fails, docMan carries on working on the other without interruption. A bitmap ensures that after a power cut or a replacement only changed areas are resynchronised.
- Encryption: LUKS2 with AES-XTS (256 bit). If the SSDs or the entire device are stolen, the data is worthless without the key.
- Unlocking without a password: The key is held by the device's security chip (TPM 2.0). It releases it only if the device starts with an unchanged Secure Boot chain (PCR 7). If the device is booted from a foreign storage medium or the SSDs are installed in another computer, the data stays locked.
- Recovery key: A second, long recovery key exists in case the mainboard has to be replaced. It was generated on the device, is kept only in the customer's password manager and has never been passed on by email, chat or file.
- System SSD unencrypted: Deliberately, so that the box starts without any input after a power cut. It holds only the operating system and programs. The database, too, is on the encrypted mirror, not on the system SSD.
A3 · Network and access
| Path | Who / what | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Browser in the office LAN → box | Staff | HTTPS only (port 443) to docMan, login with username and password; devices outside additionally receive a code by email |
| Maintenance (SSH) → box | docMan (us) | Only via Tailscale (WireGuard-encrypted), only with an SSH key; SSH is blocked from the LAN |
| Internet → box | nobody | No port forwarding on the router needed or wanted; all other incoming connections are dropped (ufw firewall) |
| Box → internet | Box | Outgoing: updates, Tailscale, email, document import (see A6), the nightly backup |
| Box → other devices on the Tailscale network | Box | Blocked by an access rule (ACL): the box may not reach anyone; only we may connect to it |
SSH is configured strictly: login with a key only (password and keyboard-interactive login off), no direct root access, no forwarding (TCP, agent, Unix sockets, tunnels and X11 – all off). This means no tunnel into the customer's network can be built via our access.
No remote editors: Tools such as VS Code Remote, Cursor or Windsurf, which install themselves on servers and often bring AI assistants with them, are blocked on the box: their installation folders are occupied by empty, write-protected files owned by root, and without forwarding they couldn't work anyway.
Listening services: Apart from SSH and, later, docMan (443), only Tailscale itself and the local DNS service (only within the box) are listening. Every other service is deliberately not installed.
A4 · Operation and maintenance
- Security updates are installed by the box itself every day (unattended-upgrades).
- We regularly check SSD health (S.M.A.R.T.: temperature, wear, errors) and mirror health; a warning is sent to us before wear turns into a failure.
- Monthly mirror check (system schedule, first Sunday of the month): both SSDs are read in full and compared against each other.
- Our access is used for docMan updates, checking the mirror, SSDs and backup, and troubleshooting. We look at documents only if the customer asks us to for troubleshooting.
A5 · Backup
Every night an encrypted backup of the database and documents is created. It is sent via Tailscale to an off-site backup location, where it is only appended (append-only): even someone who takes over the box can neither change nor delete old backups. The box does not have the key to open the backup – it can only encrypt. Where the backup is stored – with us, at the owner's home or in a German data centre – depends on the option chosen; nobody there can read it.
A6 · What the box sends out
docMan reads receipts and invoices using an AI (Claude by Anthropic): invoice number, amount, supplier, category. For this, the content of the document in question is transmitted, encrypted, to Anthropic's interface. Processing by Anthropic takes place on the basis of Anthropic's Data Processing Addendum (DPA). A data processing agreement between the customer and docMan governs our maintenance access and names the sub-processors (Anthropic, backup server). Beyond that, nothing leaves the box apart from emails that docMan sends on the customer's behalf, and the encrypted backup.
A7 · What we check before every handover
| Check | How |
|---|---|
| SSH with key only | Password login attempted → rejected |
| SSH forwarding | all off, including X11 |
| Isolation | Box reaches nothing on the Tailscale network; SSH from the LAN blocked |
| Restart | Mirror is unlocked via TPM without any input |
| Power cut | Plug pulled → box starts by itself, data complete |
| SSD failure | One SSD removed from the mirror → data still readable and writable, then complete again |
| Recovery key | generated and tested, held only by the customer |
| Mirror check | both SSDs compared in full |
| UPS | Power off → clean shutdown, restart |
| Backup | Backup and restore to empty storage |
| Warning on SSD failure | Notification in docMan and to us |
| Restricted rights | Maintenance user without blanket administrator rights |
Part B – If the customer provides the server
We are software developers, not hardware dealers, and we don't sell devices. The customer buys our reference device themselves – or they or their IT provide another suitable computer. We check it remotely against this specification and install docMan only once everything is in order. The setup is then the same as in Part A.
B1 · Hardware
| Component | Minimum | Recommended |
|---|---|---|
| Form factor | Computer for continuous operation, x86-64 | Business mini PC (e.g. Lenovo ThinkCentre Tiny, HP Elite Mini, Dell OptiPlex Micro) |
| Processor | 4 cores, current generation | 6 cores or more |
| Memory | 16 GB | 32 GB |
| System SSD | 256 GB NVMe | 512 GB NVMe |
| Data SSDs | 2 identical NVMe SSDs of 1 TB each, separate from the system | 2 × 2 TB with high write endurance (e.g. Samsung 990 Pro, ≥ 1,200 TBW) |
| Security chip | TPM 2.0, Secure Boot (UEFI) | – |
| Network | 1 GbE wired | –; Wi-Fi is not used |
| UPS | UPS with USB connection, supported by NUT | APC Back-UPS 700–750 VA |
| Operating system | no Windows needed – the drives are set up completely from scratch | If possible, order the device without a Windows licence |
B2 · Firmware settings (BIOS/UEFI)
- Secure Boot on, TPM 2.0 on.
- After a power cut: power on (“After Power Loss: Power On”).
- Boot from the system SSD; Fast Boot off; manufacturer-specific special functions that alter Secure Boot off.
- A firmware password is welcome; it is kept by the customer's IT.
B3 · Network and location
- Fixed LAN connection, static IP address or DHCP reservation.
- Outgoing to the internet: HTTPS (TCP 443) and UDP for Tailscale (41641 and 3478/STUN). No incoming port forwarding on the router.
- From the office LAN to the box: TCP 443 (docMan in the browser).
- A lockable, ventilated place; box and UPS on a separate circuit, if possible.
B4 · Steps to commissioning
- Provision by the customer: hardware as per B1, settings as per B2, connection as per B3. The IT installs Ubuntu Server (LTS version specified by us) with OpenSSH and registers the device on our Tailscale network using a one-time key that we send. Alternatively, we supply a USB stick that does this without any further questions.
- Remote check by us: We remotely check the processor, memory, SSDs (model, size, health), TPM and Secure Boot, network and UPS connection, and send a check report. If something doesn't fit, the report states what needs to be changed.
- Approval: We proceed only once the check report has no open points. Until then, nothing is set up on the data drives.
- Initial installation by us: mirror, encryption with TPM, firewall, isolation, UPS, docMan and backup – as in Part A. The customer (or their IT) generates the recovery key themselves and keeps it safe.
- Acceptance: We run through the checklist from A7 (restart, power cut, SSD failure, backup and restore) and hand over the report. Operation then begins.
B5 · Who is responsible for what
| Task | Customer / customer's IT | docMan |
|---|---|---|
| Hardware, warranty, replacement of faulty parts | ✓ | reports defects (e.g. SSD warning) |
| Power, UPS, network, location | ✓ | – |
| Keeping the recovery key safe | ✓ | – |
| Operating system, updates, security settings | – | ✓ |
| docMan, database, backup, monitoring | – | ✓ |
| Users and rights in docMan | ✓ (customer's admin) | helps with setup |
Please agree any changes to the box outside this division of responsibilities with us in advance – such as additional software, virus scanners or monitoring agents – so that isolation and encryption are not weakened unnoticed.